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PROPERTY ASSESSMENT REMEDIES FOR
THE KENTUCKY TAXPAYER
I. INTRODUCTION
Probably no subject is more discussed and less understood by
citizens of any state than taxation, and ad valorem taxes, or prop-
erty taxes as they are most commonly known, in particular seem
to generate more controversy than any other type of taxation.
Unfortunately, most taxpayers seem to regard property taxes
much as they do the weather-a subject to bemoan but one
incapable of remedy. The purpose of this note is to point out the
avenues available to a taxpayer to remedy overassessment and dis-
proportionate assessment of property for property tax levies. One
of the most difficult problems of the taxpayer wishing to protest
an assessment1 is the proverbial problem of not being able to see
the forest for the trees or, more literally, not being able to see the
remedies for the statutes. It is hoped that this note may in at least
a small way assist interested parties in successfully dealing with a
number of non-functionally grouped statutes relating to property
assessment.
To appreciate the remedies available to a taxpayer, it is neces-
sary to have a basic understanding of the tax structure in Kentucky
as it concerns property taxes. There are four principal levels of
government which levy and collect property taxes in Kentucky:
1. State Government: The legislature fixes state property-tax
rates which presently range from one-tenth of a cent to 47.5 cents
per $100 of assessed value depending upon the type of property
upon which the tax is levied.
2. County Government: The fiscal court in each county estab-
lishes the property-tax rates within the limits imposed by the
Kentucky Constitution and state statutes. The constitution3 and
statutes4 now limit the tax that a fiscal court can levy to 50 cents
1"Assessment" is commonly used in two different senses. It is used
synonymously with valuation of property, but it is also commonly used to refer
to the actual levying of a tax after valuation has been completed and the tax rate
applied to the valuation. When the term is used in this note, it is intended to
have the valuation meaning.2 KY. ryEv. STAT. [hereinafter KRSI §§ 132.020, 132.030, 132.050, 132.200,
136.270, 136.300, 136.320 (Baldwin's 1969).
3 Ky. CONST. § 157.
4 KISS § 68.090 (Badwin's 1969),
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per $100 of assessed value of the property being taxed where the
income is to be used for other than school purposes.
3. City Government: The city legislative body promulgates
property tax rates within imposed restrictions. The constitution
provides that the maximum property-tax rate, for other than
school purposes, for towns and cities of 15,000 or more population
shall be $1.50 per $100 of assessed value; for towns and cities
having less than 15,000 but not less than 10,000, $1.00 per $100;
and for towns and cities having less than 10,000 people, 75 cents
per $100.5
4. School Government: The boards of education of the various
school districts establish the property-tax rates within statutory
restrictions and the taxes are then levied by the fiscal court
of each county except in the case of independent school districts
embraced by cities of the first four classes where the tax is levied
by the city.6 The property-tax rate for school purposes is not
less than 25 cents per $100 of assessed value of the property being
taxed and not more than $1.50 per $100.'
The procedures used to assess and levy property taxes vary
with each level of government and therefore the assessment pro-
cedures of each governmental subdivision will be examined.
STATE
The Kentucky Department of levenue, which exercises all
administrative functions of the state with regard to collection of
state revenue and administration of the tax laws, directly assesses
distilled spirits," domestic building and loan associations' capital
stock,9 domestic life insurance companies' taxable capital and
reserves, 0 and public service companies' property.'" The state
does tax other property, but it relies on assessments made by the
county property valuation administrators 2 for such property. On
G Ky. CONST. § 157.
6 KBS § 160.460 (Baldwin's 1969).
7 KRS § 160.475 (Baldwin s 1969).8 KRS § 132.140 (Baldwin's 1969).
s KRS § 136.290 (Baldwin's 1969).
1o KRS § 136.320 (Baldwin's 1969).
11 KRS § 136.120 (Baldwin's 1969).
-
2 County property valuation administrators, formerly known as county tax
commissioners, are elected by county voters but make assessment of county
property under the supervision of the Kentucky Department of Revenue. KRS §§
132.370(2), 132.420(1) (Baldwin's 1969).
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those items assessed by the Department of Revenue, the assess-
ment and levying procedure is much less complex than the
procedure employed at lower levels of government. Once the
assessment is made by a state official, the Department of Revenue
mails the taxpayer a notice of the tax.
COUNTY
The county governments follow a more intricate procedure in
their assessment of property. Owners of taxable property are
required to list that property with the property valuation admin-
istrator of the county where the property is located. The valuation
must be the value of the property as of January 1 of each year
except for a few specified items which have a different valuation
date, and the listing with the property valuation administrator
must take place between January 1 and March 1, with a few
exceptions.13 If a taxpayer fails to list his property, the valuation
administrator may at any time list and assess the property and
notify the taxpayer. Property so listed is subject to a penalty.14
This listing by the owner is not the official assessment but only
evidence from which assessment may be made. 5 Thus, at least
theoretically, the county property valuation administrator assesses
the property, at its fair cash value 6 and he may visit the taxpayer,
inspect the property, consult records or property schedules, and
use any other evidence he is able to obtain to locate, identify,
and assess the property.'7
The property valuation administrator must complete his
assessment and preparation of the tax roll of all property by the
first Monday in May of each year. He must also, by that same
date, file a recapitulation of the tax roll with the Department of
Revenue. The Department of Revenue, within two weeks, directs
any changes it deems necessary to correct the county assess-
ments.'8 The tax roll is officially open for inspection in the
property valuation administrator's office for five days beginning
IsKRS § 132.220(1) (Baldwin's 1969).
14 KRS §§ 132.310, 132.320 (Baldwins 1969).
35_Kentucky River Coal Corp. v. Knott County Bd. of Supervisors, 54 S.W.2d
377 (Ky. 1932).
16 Ky. CONST. § 172.
17KRS § 132.450 (Baldwin's 1969).18 KRS § 133.040 (Baldwin's 1969).
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with the first Monday in May.19 However, being a public record,
the tax roll may be inspected by taxpayers at other times.20
Crry
Any city regardless of size may, by ordinance, elect to use the
annual county assessment for property situated within the city.
Notwithstanding any statutory provisions to the contrary, the
assessment dates of a city making this election must conform to
the corresponding county dates as discussed above. Such a city
may also, by ordinance, abolish any office connected with city
assessment and equalization. 2 ' The practical effect of abolishing
any such office is the substitution of the equivalent county assess-
ment system for the abolished office (this has significance for the
city taxpayer who is challenging his assessment as he may thereby
find himself challenging a county, rather than a city agency's
action). Assuming that the city does not choose to use the county
assessment, city assessment procedures depend upon the class of
city and, as shall be mentioned later, in the case of cities of the
second, fifth and sixth class, upon the city's determination of the
system it wishes to design for itself. A brief description of the
statutory city assessment provision should serve to illustrate the
complexity and non-uniformity of city assessment procedures.
Every person owning or holding taxable property within a
first-class city must provide the city assessor with a list of the
property; if any person fails to provide such a list, the assessor
may nevertheless assess the property using the best information
that he can obtain.2 If the assessor concludes that the taxpayer
has omitted any taxable property or has undervalued his listed
property, he may assess the omitted property or raise the valuation
of the property.23 The city assessor is required by statute to assess
all property at its fair cash value as of July 1 of each year 24 and,
on or before September 10th or as soon thereafter as is practicable,
to make available to the public, records indicating the assessed
value of all property.2 5
19 The statute further provides that the Department of Revenue may direct
a different period for inspection of the tax roll. KRS § 133.045 (Baldwin's 1969).
20 O. Ky. Agr'y GN. 43,597 (1959).
21 KRS § 132.285 (Baldwin's 1969).
22 KRS § 91.320 (Baldwin's 1969).
23 KRS § 91.330 (Baldwin's 1969).
24 KRS § 91.310 (Baldwin's 1969).
25 KRS § 91.350 (Baldwin's 1969).
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In cities of the second class, all persons having property subject
to city taxation must, prior to September 1, furnish the city as-
sessor a list of such property with its value as of July 1. On or
before December 1 of each year, the assessor must return his
records to the auditor's office for public inspection until the records
are transmitted to the board of equalization.26
In cities of the third class, there is no statutory requirement
for taxpayers to list their property. The city assessor simply
assesses property subject to city assessment upon, or as soon
thereafter as practicable, an assessment date fixed by the city
legislative body.27
In cities of the fourth class there is again no statutory require-
ment for taxpayers to list their property, but the burden is placed
on the city assessor to call upon all taxpayers and request a state-
ment under oath by the taxpayer as to the taxable property in
his possession as of April 1. The assessor then assesses the
property after it has been physically viewed by him or an
assistant. 28
In cities of the fifth and sixth classes the assessor is required to
prepare a list of taxable property between January 1 and March 1
and between July 1 and November 1, respectively, of each year.
The process of assessment is required to be in conformity with the
laws regulating the duties of the county property valuation
administrator where not otherwise provided by statute or city
ordinance. The assessors of fifth and sixth class cities are to
deposit the list with the city clerk on or before the first Monday
in March and December, respectively.29 There are no statutory
provisions as to the period of public inspection of the tax rolls in
cities of the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth classes. However, this
is of little practical significance since, as previously noted, these
are public records which may be inspected by taxpayers at any
time. 0
It should be apparent from the foregoing that it is impossible
to generalize concerning assessment procedures in cities of
various classes. Another statutory provision3' makes even this
26 KRS § 92.430 (Baldwin's 1969).
27 KRS §§ 92.420, 92.460 (Baldwin's 1969).
28 KRS § 92.490 (Baldwin's 1969).
29 KRS § 92.520 (Baldwin's 1969).
30 Op. Ky. Ar'y GEN. 43,597 (1959).
31 KRS § 92.540 (Baldwin's 1969).
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delineation of specific provisions potentially futile as it allows
second, fifth, and sixth class cities to change the manner of
assessment, levy, and collection of taxes from that provided by
statute with only minimal restrictions as to what method of pro-
cedure the cities may adopt.
SCHOOL DIsnucTs
School districts do not become involved in assessment at all.
School taxes are based upon the assessment made by the level of
government which levies the tax for its school system."2
II. REMEDIES FOR IMPROPER TAX AssEssm:NT
It is convenient to separate the discussion of remedies for
improper tax assessment into two categories: remedies for im-
proper valuation and remedies for disproportionate assessment.
The former category concerns the remedies available to the tax-
payer whose property has not been valued correctly by the
assessing authority, e.g., a farm whose fair cash value is $50,000
is assessed at $100,000. The latter category concerns the remedies
available to the taxpayer who bears a disproportionate tax burden
due to the relationship of the assessment of his property to the
assessment of the property of other taxpayers within the assessing
jurisdiction, e.g., a farm is assessed for county tax purposes at 90
percent of its fair cash value while other farms in that county
are assessed at 60 percent; or farms in one county are assessed
at 60 percent of fair cash value for state tax purposes while farms
in other counties tend to be assessed at only 40 percent.
A. REMEDIES FOR IMPROPER VALUATION
1. STATE AssEssVENTs
For corporations and other property mentioned above which
are assessed directly by the Department of Revenue rather than
by the county property valuation administrators, the appeal takes
the following form: after the Department of Revenue mails the
taxpayer a notice of the tax levied, the assessment becomes final
at the expiration of thirty days from the date of notice, if the
taxpayer does not file a written protest with the Department of
821 RS § 160,460 (Ba1dwin's 1969). See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
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Revenue. The protest must be accompanied by a supporting
statement giving the grounds for and information upon which
the protest is made. The taxpayer may request either a written
rule on the filed protest or a conference with the department or
its agent, to be attended by the taxpayer or his representative.
After consideration of the taxpayer's protest and any matters
presented at the conference, the department will issue a ruling.
If the taxpayer is dissatisfied with this ruling, he may appeal to
the Kentucky Board of Tax Appeals [hereinafter KBTA],33 an
administrative review agency vested with exclusive jurisdiction
to hear and determine appeals from final rulings, orders and
determinations of any state or county agency affecting revenue or
taxation. 4 If still unsatisfied, the taxpayer may, within thirty
days after the KBTA decision becomes final, file a petition of
appeal to the Franklin County Circuit Court or to the circuit
court of the county in which the aggrieved party resides or con-
ducts his business. The circuit court will hear the cause upon the
record of the KBTA and dispose of the cause in a summary
manner. 5 A final appeal may be made to the Kentucky Court of
Appeals as provided for by the Rules of Civil Procedure.36
There is some dispute as to whether the procedures noted
above are exclusive or whether a taxpayer may bring an inde-
pendent action under Kentucky Revised Statutes [hereinafter
KRS] § 134.590 which provides for refund of a tax illegally
collected.3 7 Reeves v. Kentucky Utilities Company38 construed
the legislative intent to be to provide an expeditious manner for
final determination of current disputes by statutes such as KBS §
131.110 (concerning appeal to KTBA) 9 but not to preclude
recovery by independent action under statutes such as KRS §
134.590. Likewise, Commonwealth v. Van Meter40 held that the
remedial procedures established by KRS § 131.110 were entirely
83 KRS § 131.110 (Baldwin's 1969).
34 KRS § 131.340 (Baldwin's 1969).
35 KRS § 131.370 (Baldwins 1969).36 Id.
37 KRS § 134.590 (Baldwin's 1969) provides for refund by the Department
of Revenue of any amount collected when in fact no such taxes were due
when taxes were paid under a statute held unconstitutional. Application for
refund may be made under this section within four years from the time payment
was made.
38 163 S.W.2d 482 (Ky. 1942).
89 See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
40 190 S.W.2d 668 (Ky. 1945).
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permissive.41 In Reeves v. Service Lines Incorporated42 the Court
of Appeals held that a corporation could maintain an independent
action to enjoin collection of a tax where the assessment was
clearly void but the court held the corporation could not maintain
an independent action where the admitted facts, or those found
by the Department of Revenue under adduced evidence, were
sufficient in law to create the tax liability, thus making the assess-
ment at most only voidable.
IRS § 181.125, enacted in 1946, stated that unless otherwise
specifically provided for by law, no appeal from or review of any
ruling, order, or finding of the Department of Revenue or Ken-
tucky Tax Commission should be allowed except as provided for
in KRS § 181.110. As would be expected, the Court of Appeals
thereafter consistently held, on the basis of KRS § 181.125, that the
remedial provisions of KRS § 131.110 were exclusive." However,
KRS § 181.125 was repealed in 1964, thus raising the issue of
whether the repeal of KRS § 131.125 evidences a legislative intent
that the remedy under KRS § 131.110 is no longer to be exclusive.
Such an argument would be logical in view of the holdings of
Kentucky Utilities Company, Van Meter, and Service Lines In-
corporated, prior to the enactment of KRS § 131.125.
The foregoing discussion reveals that the taxpayer whose
property is assessed directly by the state has a reasonably ade-
quate remedy for improper assessment. The provision for a writ-
ten protest requesting a written ruling or a conference with the
Department of Revenue followed by an appeal to the KBTA
provides a reasonably simple and inexpensive administrative re-
view which will either resolve the protest or provide a record
for review by the courts.
2. CoUNTY AsSESSMENTS
After tax assessment is made by a county, an aggrieved tax-
payer may appeal to the board of supervisors, 44 a body of "rep-
utable real property owners" appointed by the county judge.45
411It should be noted, however, that the language of KRS § 131.110 has since
been made more mandatory in style. See KCRS § 131.110 (Baldwin's 1969).
42 164 S.W.2d 593 (Ky. 1942).
43 See, e.g., Koehler v. Commonwealth, 432 S.W.2d 397 (Ky. 1968); Depart-
ment of Conservation v. Co-De Coal Co., 388 S.W.2d 614 (Ky. 1964); Common-
wealth v. Kettenacher, 335 S.W.2d 339 (Ky. 1960).
44 KRS § 133.120 (Baldwin's 1969).
45 ]KRS § 133.020 (Baldwin's 1969).
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The appeal is by letter or written petition filed with the county
clerk between the time the inspection period begins (normally
the first Monday in May) and the date the board of supervisors
convenes (normally the second Monday in May).4
Appeal to the board of supervisors appears to be the exclusive
remedy when the taxpayer's complaint is that his property has
been overassessed. After the rendering of the board of super-
visor's ruling, he may appeal to the circuit court ff dissatisfied.
However, in recent years the Court of Appeals has distinguished
between cases of misassessment and cases where assessment is
alleged to be illegal or where property is claimed to be exempt
from taxation. Only in the latter cases has the Court tended
to hold that the circuit court has jurisdiction to entertain an
independent action for an injunction against collection of the
tax and for declaratory judgment as to exemption of the prop-
erty.48 The rationale seems to be that since exemption is a judicial
question, the statutory appeal to the board of supervisors required
by KRS § 138.120 is a formality which merely delays the inevitable
judicial determination.
The board of supervisors holds public hearings for all appeals.49
At a hearing, the taxpayer has the burden of proof in establishing
an erroneous assessment.8 0 After hearing all the evidence, the
board makes such changes as it deems necessary to equalize assess-
ments.51 If the taxpayer feels himself aggrieved by the action
of the board of supervisors, there is clearly an appeal but it is not
entirely clear what the appeal procedure is.
When KRS § 133.120(4) was first enacted in 1942, it provided
that any taxpayer might appeal to the circuit court [not further
identified by the statute] or the Kentucky Tax Commission
[hereinafter KTC] 2 within thirty days after adjournment of the
46 KRS §§ 133.030, 133.045, 133.120 (Baldwin's 1969).47 See Board of Supervisors v. Ware Cannel Coal Co., 179 S.W.2d 225 (Ky.
1944); Ball v. P.V. & K. Coal Co., 31 S.W.2d 707 (Ky. 1930); Farmers Natl Bank
v. Board of Supervisors, 8 S.W.2d 401 (Ky. 1928); Farm Bureau v. Pool, 265 S.W.
809 (Ky. 1924); Roger Wheel Co. v. Taylor County, 47 S.W. 876 (Ky. 1898).
48 See Jefferson Post No. 15, Am. Legion v. City of Louisville, 280 S.W.2d 706
(Ky. 1955); Iroquois Post No. 229, Am. Legion v. City of Louisville, 279 S.W.2d
13 (Ky. 1955); Todd County v. Bond Bros. 188 S W.2d 325 (Ky. 1945).
49 KRS § 133.120(2) (Baldwin's 19691.
GO Hyden v. Board of Supervisors, 51 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1932).
51 KRS § 133.120 (Baldwin's 1969).
52 The Kentucky Tax Commission [hereinafter KTC] was a commission within
the Kentucky Department of Revenue which consisted of the Commissioner of(Continued on next page)
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board of supervisors, and from the judgment of the circuit court
to the Kentucky Court of Appeals; or from the judgment of the
KTC to the Franklin County Circuit Court.53 In 1944, the section
was amended to specifically provide that appeal from the board
of supervisors must be made to either the KTC or the circuit
court where the property was located.54 In 1949, the section was
again amended to allow only fifteen days, after adjournment of
the board of supervisors, for appeal to the KTC, and all references
to an appeal to the circuit court in lieu of the KTC were deleted.
It was provided that the decision of the KTC could be appealed
to the circuit court in the county in which the property was
located and thence to the Court of Appeals.5 5 Finally, in 1964,
KRS § 133.120(4) was again amended to delete reference to chan-
nels of appeal. The current language of this section mentions
"appear' but does not indicate the manner in which the appeal
is to be made.56 However, KRS § 131.340, enacted in 1964, states:
"The Kentucky Board of Tax Appeals (KBTA) 57 is hereby vested
with exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals from
final rulings, orders, and determinations of any agency of state
or county government affecting revenue and taxation." 8 There-
fore it appears that the legislative intent was to make appeal to
the KBTA from the decisions of boards of supervisors mandatory
and to preclude an initial appeal from the board of supervisors
to a circuit court.
A party has 30 days to appeal to the KBTA from receipt of a
ruling, order, or determination of a board of supervisors. 59 Pro-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Revenue and two associate commissioners. KRS § 131.020(2) (1942). The KTC's
principal functions were assessment of that property which the Kentucky Depart-
ment of Revenue was authorized to assess, hearing appeals from findings of the
Department of Revenue, and reviewing local assessments. KRS § 131.090 (1942).6 Ky. Acrs, ch. 131 § 16 (1942).
54Ky Aars, chi. 99 11944).
55 Ky. Acrrs, chi. 2, § 7 (1949).
56Ky. AcTs, ch. 141, § 34 (1964).
57 The Kentucky Board of Tax Appeals [hereinafter KBTA] was created in
1964 as an administrative review agency and "[a]l ifies, equipment, budget, and
pending business of the Kentucky Tax Commission" were transferred to the KBTA.
Ky. AcTS, cl. 141, § 1 (1964). The KBTA consists of three members appointed
by the Governor. KRS § 131.315(1) (Baldwin's 1969). Unlike the Kentucky Tax
Commission, the KBTA has no assessment function. The KBTA's function is "to
hear and determine appeals from final rulings, orders and determinations of any
agency of state or county government affecting revenue and taxation." KRS §
131.340(1) (Baldwin's 1969).
58 Ky. AcTs, ch. 141, § 6 (1964).
59KBS § 131.340(2) (Baldwins 1969).
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ceedings before the KBTA are de novo but findings are restricted
to issues raised by the parties.60 Expenses of such hearings are
paid by the state.(" The KBTA may affirm, reverse, modify or
remand the order of an agency appealed from and its findings
must be written. Any taxes, interest or penalties paid but found
not to be due are refunded. 62
If a taxpayer is aggrieved by the KBTA decision, he may
appeal to a circuit court within thirty days after the decision
becomes final, by filing a petition of appeal. If the appeal was
originally from a county board of supervisors, appeal is taken to
the circuit court of the county in which the appeal originated.
If the appeal was from other than a county board of supervisors,
the appeal is to the Franklin County Circuit Court or to the
circuit court of the county in which the taxpayer resides or does
business. A party may appeal from the circuit court to the Court
of Appeals in accordance with the Kentucky Rules of Civil
Procedure.63
Thus it appears that the taxpayer whose property is assessed
by a county also has a reasonably adequate procedure for pro-
testing that assessment. By being allowed to appeal to the county
board of supervisors, the taxpayer is spared the expense of a
judicial proceeding. The taxpayer need not incur the expense of
legal counsel since the protest may be in the form of a letter, and
the simplicity of the public hearing will probably be such that
the taxpayer can present his own case. Though perhaps the tax-
payer is not well advised to present his own argument, it is desir-
able at least at this initial hearing stage, that the administrative
process be simple enough to permit self-representation since many
of the tax liabilities in question will be relatively small. If legal
counsel were necessary to present such a protest, the cost would
probably cause the protest of small assessment errors to be fore-
gone, a result that is undesirable both from the standpoint of pub-
lie confidence in the revenue system and of the efficiency of the
system.
The county taxpayer has yet another level of administrative
appeal, the KBTA, to which he may appeal the ruling of the board
6O KRS § 131.345 (Baldwin's 1969).
61 KRS § 131.355(3) (Baldwin's 1969).
62KRS § 131.360 (Baldwins 1969).
63 KRS § 131.370 (Baldwins 1969).
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of supervisors before taking his case into the state court system.
Though the fact that the state pays the expense of this hearing
favors the small taxpayer, there still seems to be a need for a
small claims procedure at this level. Such a procedure might allow
a very informal appeal such as a written statement of the grounds
for protest and any accompanying facts the taxpayer wished to
present for consideration. The use of this informal procedure, as
opposed to the formal hearing normally conducted by KBTA,
could be made contingent upon the tax liability in question not
exceeding a certain amount and the signing by the taxpayer of a
waiver of his right to appeal the KBTA ruling to the state courts. 64
3. Crry AssEssumNTs
As indicated above, a city may, by ordinance, abolish any
office connected with city assessment and equalization 5 and the
city legislative body in second, fifth, and sixth class cities may
change the manner of assessment, levy, and collection of taxes
from that provided by statute.66 There is considerable variation in
statutory procedures for appeal from a city assessment, depending
on the class of city which made the assessment. It is therefore
impossible to generalize as to remedies except to say that there
are no statutory provisions for administrative review of city
assessments at the state level by the KBTA as there are for state
and county assessments. Also it is important to note that city
assessment activities are not placed under the supervision of the
Department of Revenue as are county assessment activities.
Because of this difficulty in generalizing as to remedial procedures,
discussion will be confined to a very basic survey of the statutory
procedures for appeal from assessments of cities of various classes.
Cities of the First Class: KRS § 91.400(1) provides that any
taxpayer who feels aggrieved by his assessment may file his com-
plaint with the assessor. The board of equalization, which con-
sists of three citizens of the city elected annually by the board of
aldermen, 67 investigates all complaints and approves, reduces, or
64 Such a small claims procedure was proposed by the Advisory Commission
on Intergovernmental Relations [hereinafter cited ACIR]. 'nRoosnn STATuTE ON
AssESsMENT NoTIFcATioN, REVIEW, " D APPEAL PROcEDURE, 30 SUGGESTED STATE
LEISLATIoN 19, 23-24 (1971).65KRS § 132.285 (Baldwin's 1969).
06KRS § 92.540 (Baldwin's 1969).
67 KRS § 91.390 (Baldwins 1969).
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raises the assessment. Either the city or the taxpayer may appeal
the action of the board of equalization to the county quarterly
court within thirty days after adjournment of the board and may
further appeal the action of the quarterly court to the circuit
court and then to the Court of Appeals."
Cities of the Second Class: KRS § 92.440(3) provides that the
board of equalization, which consists of three persons selected
by the city legislative body,69 shall hear all complaints made
against assessments. Any taxpayer whose assessment is not de-
creased after his complaint may, within thirty days after adjourn-
ment of the board, appeal to the county quarterly court, and
either party may appeal from the quarterly court to the circuit
court and then to the Court of AppealsJ
Cities of the Third Class: KRS § 92.480(2) provides that any
person aggrieved by the action of the assessor or by the action
of the board of supervisors, which consists of three persons ap-
pointed by the mayor 71 to supervise all assessments,7 2 may appeal
to the common council, which is the legislative branch of the city
government composed of twelve men elected for two year terms.7 3
The common council may make such changes in the assessment
as are just and equitable, but if the taxpayer is not satisfied, he
may appeal to the quarterly court of the county where the prop-
erty is located, from there to the circuit court, and finally to the
Court of Appeals. 74
Cities of the Fourth Class: KRS § 92.510(2) provides that the
supervisors of taxes, three freeholders appointed annually by the
city council,75 shall hear complaints of taxpayers as to assessments
and may increase or decrease such assessments. Appeals from the
action of the supervisors are the same as those for appeal from
an action of the board of equalization of fifth and sixth class
cities, 76 as indicated below.
Cities of the Fifth and Sixth Class: KRS § 92.530(1) provides
that the board of equalization, which consists of three property
68 KS § 91.400(2) (Baldwin's 1969).
69 KRS § 92.240 (Baldwin's 1969).
70 KRS § 92.440(9) Baldwin's 1969).
71 KRS § 92.250 (Baldwin's 1969).
72KRS § 92.480(1) (Baldwin's 1969).
73 KRS §§ 85.040, 85.060(1) (Baldwin's 1969).
74 KRS § 92.480(2) (Baldwin's 1969).
75 KRS § 92.260 (Baldwin's 1969).
76 KRS § 92.510(4) (Baldwin's 1969).
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owners appointed by the city council of each fifth class city and
by the board of trustees of each sixth class city,77 may hear com-
plaints and may correct, modify, or strike out any assessments.
Any taxpayer aggrieved by the action of the board of equalization
may appeal to the quarterly court of the county within thirty
days after the adjournment of the board and either party may
further appeal to the circuit court.78 Although not specifically
provided for by statute, further appeal to the Court of Appeals
would obviously be appropriate.
The statutory procedures for appeal from city assessments raise
a variety of questions, such as exclusivity of remedy which, for the
most part, remain unanswered and their determination awaits
action by the courts.
The city taxpayer does not have an adequate administrative
remedy. Because there is no statutory provision for administrative
review by the KBTA as there is for state and county assessment,
the taxpayer may be forced to appeal his assessment through the
entire state court system, a procedure that is costly and time con-
suming. There are at least two possible approaches to the solution
of this problem.
The first approach would be to make it mandatory, by statute,
that cities use the assessment of the county in which they are
located, a procedure that is currently only permissive. A second
approach would be to allow cities to make their own assessments
and maintain their own offices of assessment and equalization
but provide for review by the KBTA of the decision of the city
review body, whether it be called a board of supervisors, board
of equalization, or whatever.
Of the two approaches, the former would seem to offer the
most promise. In a time when cities are increasingly unable to
provide necessary services due to lack of funds, it seems logical
to eliminate a service which is duplicative and must necessarily
be performed by the county for its own purposes. It is difficult
to envision a city being able to maintain its own assessment and
equalization system at a lower cost than it could contract for such
services from a county which already has a functioning assessment
and equalization system and which is already assessing city
77KRS § 92.270(1) (Baldwin's 1969).
78 KRS § 92.530(2) (Baldwin's 1969).
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property. Under such a solution the city taxpayer could make
his protest through the same channels the county taxpayer cur-
rently uses, including review by the KBTA.
B. REMEDIES FOR DISPROPORTIONATE ASSESSMENT
As previously indicated, the procedures for challenging im-
proper valuation are fairly well structured by statutes, and while
these laws are not free from ambiguity there is at least an
established general remedial procedure to be followed by the tax-
payer. However, disproportionate assessments among taxpayers
is an area in which the taxpayer's remedy has been, until very
recently, far more speculative.
Although the Kentucky Constitution has always required as-
sessment at fair cash value, the requirement has been largely
disregarded. The result had been assessment at differing per-
centages of fair cash value in different counties throughout the
state, thus violating the Kentucky constitutional requirements for
uniformity. Three sections of the Kentucky Constitution are
important in this connection: Section 171 provides that taxes
shall be uniform upon all property of the same class subject to
taxation within the territorial limits of the authority levying the
tax and that all taxes shall be levied and collected by general
laws. Section 172 provides that all property shall be assessed at
its fair cash value, estimated at the price the property would bring
at a fair voluntary sale. Section 174 provides that all property
shall be taxed in proportion to its value unless exempted by the
Kentucky Constitution. These sections of the constitution do not
specifically state that the ratio of assessments to value must be
uniform throughout the state, 9 but it appears that this was the
intent of the framers.80
79 Mueblenkamp, Remedies for Disproportionate Tax Assessment in Kentucky,
36 Ky. L.J. 401 (1948).80 In the course of debate during the constitutional convention concerning a
proposed section which subsequently became § 172 of the constitution, Chairman
Johnson of the Revenue and Taxation Committee made it clear that the committee
was concerned about the problem of varying ratios of assessment to value
throughout the state and was proposing a constitutional provision which the
committee believed would prevent it:
The fourth section provides that all property shall be assessed for taxation
at its fair cash value, estimated at the price it would bring at a fair
voluntary sale. It will not be denied that assessments should be uniform.
The cash value is the only safe and uniform standard, and we, therefore,
recommend it. It is undoubtedly right. If your property is assessed at
(Continued on next page)
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There are two dependent principles embodied in these con-
stitutional provisions: uniformity of taxation within the territorial
limits of the taxing authority and assessment at fair cash value.
As one authority points out, if uniformity was intended to mean
uniformity of burden and not just uniformity of tax rate, and if
the state and county assessment are the same [as they are on
most property] and if the assessment ratio for the various counties
vary greatly [as they have in the past], the burden of state taxation
is not uniform even if the rate of taxation is exactly the same in all
counties. 8 ' Likewise, the burden of county taxation is not uniform
where the assessment ratios vary within a county.
In Eminence Distillery Company v. Henry County Board of
Supervisors,82 concerning sections 171, 172 and 174 of the con-
stitution, the Court indicated that uniformity of burden was the
intended meaning8s The taxpayer here successfully challenged
the unequal assessment of his property at 100 percent of fair cash
value when other property in the same county was assessed at 60
percent. The case presented the Court with a dilemma since the
only way to comply with the constitutional requirements of uni-
formity and assessment at 100 percent fair cash value was to raise
the assessment of all other property in that county to 100 percent.
This the Court of Appeals declined to do and instead lowered the
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
half its value, the rate will be twice as high as if it were assessed at its
full value. The same sum must be paid. It is a question simply as to the
best method of doing it; and I submit that the recommendation of the
Committee is best and most business-like. The great trouble in our
system has been unequal assessments. You all know that assessors in
different localities fix different standards of value, thereby imposing on
different communities, different rates of taxation. . . Land in one
locality pays a tax altogether different from that paid by land of equal
value in another locality. These evils ought to be remedied, yet they have
existed time out of mind without check or hindrance. To prevent them we
propose this provision, that any officer or other person authorized to
assess property for taxation, who shall commit any gross and willful error
in the performance of his duty, shall be deemed guilty of misfeasance,
and, upon conviction thereof, shall forfeit his office, and be otherwise
punished as may be provided by law. 2 DFBATES, CoNsrrruToNL CON-
vENTioN 2384-85 (1890).81 Muehlenkamp, supra note 79, at 411.
82 200 S.W. 347 (Ky. 1918).
83 These sections of the Constitution [171, 172 and 174] not only require
that the rate of taxation upon all property shall be uniform, but it just as
emphatically demands and requires that the burden of taxation upon all
property shall be equal.... In order that taxes levied shall be lawful and
have the sanction of the Constitution, it is essential that, the burden which
it imposes shall have the necessary virtue of equality as that it shall be
uniform. Id. at 350,
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assessment of the plaintiff to 60 percent.84 The court cited Randell
v. City of Bridgeports as an authority for its decision. Randell
provides a concise summation of the dilemma in the context of a
city assessment and the solution subsequently followed by the
Court of Appeals in Eminence Distillery.8
Eminence Distillery was concerned only with equality and
uniformity of taxation within the county taxing unit. It did not
raise the issue of whether the Court's solution (ordering all
property valued at 60 percent of fair cash value) still permitted
inequality from the standpoint of state taxes based on the county
assessment. That is, if other counties had been assessing property
at less than 60 percent, taxpayers of Henry County would have
shouldered an unequal share of state taxation. And, if the Court
had held that all the property of Henry County was to be assessed
at 100 percent, greater inequality in state tax burden would have
resulted although, from the standpoint of the county tax burden,
the decision would have been entirely consistent with the Ken-
tucky Constitution.
The Kentucky Tax Commission was created in 1942 to remedy
the obvious injustice of the varying ratios of assessed value to
fair cash value that existed from county to county.8 7 KTC was
given the duty to equalize annually the assessments of property
among the counties by ordering increases or decreases in aggre-
gate assessed valuation of the property of any county or taxing
district.88 By amendment in 1964, the Department of Revenue
84 Id. at 349-52.
85 28 A. 523 (Conn. 1893).
86 The dilemma is analyzed in the Randell opinion as follows:
There are two ways in which a taxpayer may be wronged in levying
taxes. An assessment may conform to the statute generally, and the
individual may be assessed in excess of the statutory requirement. A
wrong of that description is easily redressed. But when the town dis-
regards the statute, and establishes a rule of its own, assessing the property
at one-half of its actual value, and then assesses an individual at the fall
value of the property, while the injury is the same, the application of
the remedy becomes more complicated. Practically, the ony way to
redress the wrong is to reduce the assessment, and that makes the court
seem to disregard the statute; while, if the wrong is not redressed, there
is a denial of justice, and the court practically ignores the statute giving
an aggreved party an appeal, and practically ignores the statute which
provides that -"said court shall have power to grant such relief as shall
to justice and equity a pertain. Under the circumstances, we do not
hesitate to choose the former and to redress the wrong. Id.
87 Ky. Actrs, ch. 131, §§ 23, 32 (1942).
8814,
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was given this duty. 9 One authority maintained that this duty
was mandatory rather than directive,9" an interpretation sub-
sequently adopted by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in a case to
be discussed belowf 1 The KTC's function was to insure at least
approximate uniformity of assessment throughout the state at or
near fair cash value. Unfortunately, the courts had already taken
the position that absolute equality could not be attained92 and
had allowed assessors to disregard the strict requirement of fair
cash value assessment, treating the requirement as only requiring
uniformity at a general level of proportional values in assessing
various classes of property. 3 The effect upon the legislative
mandate to the commission to equalize assessments by fixing
assessment at fair cash value was predictable. For example, the
average assessment ratio [assessed value to sale price] for real
estate fell from approximately 60 percent in 194394 to about 26
percent in 1965.15 During this same period, the number of
counties ordered to raise their assessments went from 55 in 1943
to three in 1948 to one in 1953.96 There was a flurry of enforce-
ment in 1954 when 62 counties were ordered to increase their
assessments, 97 but this move was so politically unpopular that no
increases were again ordered until 196698 and then only after a
landmark case in the Court of Appeals.9 9 Even when equalization
was ordered, it sometimes bore little resemblance to the action
necessary for equality. For example, Wolfe County's assessment
was raised 10 percent in 1945 in spite of the fact that it was already
assessing at 112.7 percent of fair cash value at the time.100
It can be seen from the foregoing that Kentucky courts were
willing to provide a remedy for a taxpayer whose property was
assessed at a higher percentage of fair cash value than that of
89 Ky. Acrs, chi. 141, § 16 (1964).
00 Mueblenkamp, supra note 79, at 412.
91 See note 103 infra and accompanying text.
92 Swift Coal and Timber Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 3 S.W.2d 1067 (Ky.
1928); Eminence Distillery Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 200 S.W. 347, 350 (Ky.
1918 jPrestonsburg Water Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 131 S.W.2d 451 (Ky.
1939).94 1960-1961 Ky. DEPr. OF REvEuE A' uAs, RIEP. 77 (1961).
05 1964-1965 Ky. DEPT. OF REvENuE: ANNuAL REP. 30 (1965).
96 1960-1961 Ky. DEPT. OF REvENuE AuArL REP. 75 (1961).
07 Id.
98 1965-1966 Ky. DEPT. OF REVENUE ANNuAL REP. 20 (1966).
'09 Russman v. Luckett, 391 S.W.2d 694 (Ky. 1965).
o0 Muehlenkamp, supra note 79, at 414.
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other property within the taxing jurisdiction.10 1 However, the
question as to whether a state agency and the assessors of
property could be compelled to equalize assessments between
taxing jurisdictions at fair cash value as required by the Kentucky
Constitution and by statutes remained unanswered until 1965.
Mr. Muehlenkamp perceptively noted in 1948 that though no
case had ever squarely presented the issue of whether a writ of
mandamus could be used to compel the state equalization body
[originally the Kentucky Tax Commission but now the Depart-
ment of Revenue] to revise their equalization figures, such action
was not only possible but "highly proper." 10 2 In Russman v.
Luckett'03 and a companion case 04 the issue was squarely pre-
sented.
Russman was a suit by taxpayers, parents of school children,
and students against state and county taxation authorities for a
declaration of rights and injunctive relief in the nature of man-
damus to rectify assessment in violation of constitutional and
statutory provisions requiring assessment at fair cash value. The
Court of Appeals recognized that the existing policy of flagrantly
violating section 172 of the Kentucky Constitution and its im-
plementing statutes,10 5 had to be halted. 6 The Court held that:
(1) the plaintiffs had no other adequate remedy and therefore
had the right to sue for a declaration of rights, 07 (2) the con-
stitutional provision requiring assessment at fair cash value was
not repealed by continued violation by public officials,'08 (3) past
decisions by the Court of Appeals, allowing taxpayers relief by
lowering assessments to prevailing percentages, did not annul
the constitutional provision or implementing statutes,'0 9 and (4)
101 See, e.g., Eminence Distillery Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 200 S.W. 347
(Ky. 1918).
102 Muehlenkamp, suprtr note 79, at 415.
103 391 S.W.2d 694 (Ky. 1965).
1o4 McDevitt v. Luckett, 391 S.W.2d 700 (Ky. 1965).
105 KRS §§ 132.450(1), 133.150 (Baldwin's 1969).
10 6 The existing situation was summarized by the court as follows:
It is apparent the situation is bad from almost any standpoint, is becoming
worse, is unfair, is administratively inefficient, and gives tax commissioners
[now called property valuation administrators] an unwarranted and
arbitrary control of the tax base. More significant than all of these con-
siderations, however, is the fact that the current method of assessment is
in direct violation of clearly written mandatory laws. Russman v. Luckett,
391 S.W.2d 694, 695 (Ky. 1965).
307 Id. at 696.
108 Id. at 697.
109 Id. at 698.
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mandamus was the proper remedy to require taxation officials to
make mandatory fair cash value assessments."0° The Court did
soften the potentially chaotic effect of the decision on tax ad-
ministration by delaying the necessity for positive compliance
with the requirements of assessment at full cash value until Jan-
uary 1, 1966."1 It is interesting to note that after Russman [June
1965] there were percentage raises ordered in 21 counties for
the 1966 assessment,"i2 and the average real estate assessment
ratio for 1967 was up to 90.4 percent of fair cash value."3
Russman has demonstrated that a taxpayer can bring an action
of mandamus to compel the Commissioner of Revenue to comply
with his statutory duty as head of the Department of Revenue to
annually equalize the assessments of property among the counties
at fair cash value 14 and to direct, instruct, and supervise property
valuation administrators to insure that they make assessments at
fair cash value."; In addition, it demonstrated that a taxpayer
can compel a property valuation administrator to comply with
his statutory duty to assess property at its fair cash value.11"
III. CONCLUSION
In addition to the conclusions already drawn as to the ade-
quacy of the remedy available to the taxpayer for improper tax
assessment, there is a consideration which has general applic-
ability to tax assessment by all levels of government. Since the
premise underlying all provisions for protest or appeal is that the
taxpayer will recognize misassessment of his property, it appears
that the Kentucky taxpayer should be given more immediate
access to information concerning his property assessment and the
assessment of other property within the taxing jurisdiction. For
example, an appeal from a county assessment must be filed before
the notice of tax liability is sent to the taxpayer. 1  This places
the burden on the taxpayer to inspect the assessment records
110 Id. at 698-99.
"M Id. at 699-700.
112 1965-1966 Ky. DEPT. OF RFvENuE ANrvAL REP. 20 (1966).
"13 1968-1969 Ky. DEPT. OF REVmNUE ANiQL REP. 72 (1969).
"14 KRS §§ 131.020(1), 133.150 (Baldwin's 1969).
"15 KRS §§ 131.020(1) 131.420(1), 132.450(1) (Baldwins 1969).
"16KRS § 132.450(1) (Baldwi's 1969).
"17 The appeal must be filed "between the date the inspection period begins
and the date the board of supervisors convenes." KRS § 133.120(1) (Baldwin's
1969).
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within the period allowed for appeals. Even if the taxpayer
inspects the record and determines his assessment, under the
current practice of assessing at a percentage of true value, the
taxpayer still will not know whether his property has been mis-
assessed unless he is able to determine the assessment ratio for
other property within the jurisdiction. It does not seem un-
realistic to require that assessment authorities notify taxpayers
of their assessment and the most recently computed assessment
ratio for that jurisdiction." 8 (The Kentucky Department of Rev-
enue currently makes such assessment ratio studies for each
county). This notice could be given between the time the assess-
ment is determined and the time the taxpayer is notified of the tax
liability or it could be provided as a part of the notice of tax
liability sent to the taxpayer. If the latter time of notice were
used, it would require an amendment of current statutes to allow
an appeal from misassessment to be made during an appropriate
period after notice of the assessment. It might also be worthwhile
to legislatively establish a maximum percentage of deviation
from the most recent assessment ratio and provide that if the
proven assessment ratio of a taxpayer's own property exceeded
that deviation, the assessment of the property would be con-
clusively presumed to be incorrect."9
It is hoped that at this point, if the taxpayer cannot see the
forest referred to at the beginning of this note, he at least knows
its boundaries and knows which trees are included therein. It
should also be apparent that the taxpayer's problem is not so
formidable as a cursory reading of the statutes would imply.
Richard C. Stephenson
118 Such notification procedure was proposed by ACIR. Pao'osED STATUTE ON
AssssumNr NoTimCATON, PREw, AND APPEAL PiocEDURE, supra note 64, at 20.
119 Such a presumption was proposed by ACIR. NloposE STATUTE ON As-
sEssmENT NoTIICAmION, REvmw, AND APPEAL PROCEDJRE, supra note 64, at 24.
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